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CCM MIND CLICKS on and off.... I try letting one eyelid close
at a time when I prop the other open with my will. But the
effort's too much. Sleep is winning. My whole body argues dully that
nothing, nothing life can attain, is quite so desirable as sleep. My mind
is losing resolution and control." - Charles A. Lindbergh'
I. INTRODUCTION
"I'm talking about 150 feet and he would have hit my house
and my family would have been dead," said Freddy Carter
shortly after a United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) cargo plane
crashed near his subdivision while on approach to Birmingham-




















Shuttlesworth International Airport in August 2013.2 The plane
crashed into a hill just one mile short of its target runway, killing
both pilots.3 The engines and other onboard systems were ap-
parently working correctly, and, despite the fact that the runway
lacked an instrument landing system, the runway's landing
lights should have given ample warning that the plane was flying
too low.4 So what caused the crash?
Though the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
has not released its official findings, investigators were initially
concerned that fatigue may have "impeded cockpit reactions"
when the plane's collision-avoidance system alerted the pilots
that the plane was descending too quickly.5 The pilots had re-
ported for duty the previous night and were about to complete a
nine-hour overnight shift at the time of the accident.' Not sur-
prisingly, the aircraft's cockpit voice recorder captured the pi-
lots discussing "how tired they were" and "how fatiguing they felt
UPS overnight schedules could be."'
A. FATIGUE IN AVIATION
For two decades, the NTSB has identified fatigue as one of the
most dangerous issues in the transportation industry.' Accord-
ing to sleep expert and NTSB member Dr. Mark Rosekind,
"[f]atigue can degrade every aspect of human capability."' In
the field of aviation, a pilot need not be "asleep at the stick" for
fatigue to pose a serious safety threat."o Studies have shown that
it can impair the basic functions most critical to pilots, such as
judgment, attention, concentration, and reaction time, by
2 Alan Levin et al., UPS jet Crash in Alabama Is Latest Fatal Cargo Accident,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 14, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-08-14/ups-jet-freighter-crashes-near-airport-in-birmingham-alabama.html.
3 Andy Pasztor, UPS Crash Raises Pilot-Rest, Training Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Oct.






8 Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D., Bd. Member, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Keynote Ad-
dress at the Southern California Aviation Association: The NTSB: Overview, Ad-
dressing Fatigue, and Safety Tools (Mar. 5, 2012).
9 Id.
10 Robert P. Mark, NTSB's Rosekind Warns of Pilot Fatigue and Sleep Problems at
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20-50%." In fact, fatigued individuals may be fairly character-
ized as being in an "unstable cognitive state," and for pilots a few
critical seconds of impaired reaction time may mean the differ-
ence between life and death.1 2
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recognized
three different types of fatigue: transient, cumulative, and cir-
cadian.13 Transient fatigue is caused by a singular instance of
being awake for too many consecutive hours.1 4 Cumulative fa-
tigue, on the other hand, is caused by successive days of "mild"
sleep deprivation, which accumulate into "sleep debt"-the dif-
ference between the amount of sleep you should have received
and the amount of sleep you actually received in the same pe-
riod.15 Circadian fatigue occurs when an individual experiences
diminished performance during a time when the body normally
wants to be asleep (i.e., the "window of circadian low"), which
for most people is between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.16
The frightening thing is that pilots, who frequently operate
under one or more of these types of fatigue," may be com-
pletely unaware of any impairment.18 Even when they feel awake
and alert, fatigued pilots may lack the "physiological alertness"
to respond to an emergency or even perform basic tasks prop-
erly." Furthermore, when fatigue is combined with the empty
void of the night sky and the steady drone of the plane's engine,
it is no wonder that one in seven pilots admits to having dozed
at the controls when flying overnight shifts.o
B. THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY
Many of the features inherent to air travel are the primary
factors cited by the FAA as contributing to pilot fatigue: flying
11 Rosekind, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,852,





17 See Natalie N. DuBose, Comment, Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Require-
ments: Does the Proposed Legislation Put to Rest the Concern over Pilot Fatigue?, 76J. AIR
L. & COM. 253, 256-59 (2011).
18 Mark, supra note 10.
1o See id.; Rosekind, supra note 8.
20 DuBose, supra note 17, at 256 (citing Eric Brazil, Study: OK for Pilots to Nap,
S.F. EXAMINER, June 23, 1998, at A6).
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long hours, crossing multiple time zones, and working "on the
back side of the clock."2 1 Cargo pilots, however, are particularly
vulnerable because of the extreme demands of the all-cargo bus-
iness model.
In today's global economy, air cargo carriers must conduct
"round-the-clock all-weather operations."2 For companies such
as UPS, speed is vital.2 ' A cargo shipment may comprise
pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, perishable goods, and criti-
cal industrial components.2 5 Thus, when cargo flights carrying
these items are delayed or cancelled, not only could the value of
the cargo be destroyed, but also, in some situations, lives could
be endangered. 6 UPS's Next Day Air service enables such items
to be delivered domestically and is the heart of UPS's business
model.2 1 Obviously, this express overnight service is made possi-
ble only by overnight flights to these locations.
To meet the demands of the market, cargo pilots must fly
long-haul overnight routes, often working more hours and cross-
ing more time zones than their passenger-pilot counterparts.2 9
Though many of these routes are scheduled, many are un-
scheduled.3 0 This requires cargo pilots to sleep "on the fly" in
the daytime, which further contributes to circadian fatigue."
On top of that, cargo pilots have greater cumulative fatigue as
21 Gregory Kirkland, Panel Presentation at the Aviation Fatigue Management
Symposium: Partnerships for Solutions: Crewmember Flight, Duty, and Rest Re-
quirements: FAA Regulations, Initiatives and Challenges (June 18, 2000).
22 Chesley Sullenberger & Jim Hall, A Tired Pilot Is a Tired Pilot, Regardless of the
Plane, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2013, 7:17 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article-email/
SB10001424052702303722604579115153395583242-lMyQjAxMTAzMDAwNzEwN
DcyWj.html?dsk=y.
23 David J. Wells & Jay Wells, Flight Time/Duty Time for Air Cargo, AIR LINE PILOT,
Sept. 2004, at 18, available at http://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/magazine/2004/
Sept2004_FTDTAir Cargo.htm.
24 COMMENTS OF UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO., IN THE MATTER OF NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR FLIGHTCREW MEMBER DuTY AND REST REQUIREMENTs 5
(Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=




27 Id. at 6.
28 See id.
29 Sullenberger & Hall, supra note 22.
30 DuBose, supra note 17, at 255-56.
31 Id.
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well and, according to one study, can amass a sleep debt of eight
or more hours each week."
As if fatigue was not enough, cargo pilots face additional chal-
lenges, such as flying into smaller airports with fewer safety pro-
tections (like precision instrument approach technology and
proper runway lights), flying older aircraft, and carrying more
dangerous cargo. 3 Furthermore, cargo routes may change fre-
quently as a function of demand, which "decreases the safety
margins afforded by route familiarization."3 Globally, fatal acci-
dents involving cargo planes are eight times more frequent than
those involving passenger planes. So what is being done about
this?
C. THE NEw REGULATIONS
On January 4, 2014, new FAA regulations went into effect that
ostensibly address the dangers of pilot fatigue: Flightcrew Mem-
ber Duty and Rest Requirements, codified at F.A.R. 117 (the Fi-
nal Rule or Part 117) .36 The Final Rule, which applies to Part-
121 certificate holders, sets the requirements for the amount
of rest a pilot must have before duty and places limits on the
amount of time that pilots may fly in a duty period.3 8 In addi-
tion, these requirements can vary depending on certain factors:
"the time of day pilots begin their first flight, the number of
scheduled flight segments [,] and the number of time zones they
cross."39
Although these measures are certainly steps in the right direc-
tion, the FAA departed from its original "flight path" by allowing
a blanket exemption for all-cargo operations in the Final Rule.4 0
Of course, pilots are human and therefore subject to fatigue re-
gardless of the type of plane they happen to fly. 41 Nevertheless,
32 Id.
3 Levin et al., supra note 2; Wells & Wells, supra note 23.
3 Wells & Wells, supra note 23.
3 Levin et al., supra note 2.
36 Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 330 (Jan. 4,
2012) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 117, 119, & 121) [hereinafter Final Rule].
37 14 C.F.R. § 117.1 (2014).
38 See Final Rule, supra note 36, at 14.
3 Press Release, FAA, FAA Issues Final Rule on Pilot Fatigue (Dec. 21, 2011),
available at http://www.faa.gov/news/pressreleases/news-story.cfm?news
Id=13272 [hereinafter FAA Press Release].
40 Final Rule, supra note 36, at 104.
41 Press Release, Coal. of Airline Pilots Ass'ns, CAPA Refutes the New Flight/
Duty Time Regulations (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.capapilots.org/
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after an uproar from cargo carriers, "the FAA has determined
that this rule would create far smaller benefits for all-cargo oper-
ations than it does for passenger operations."4 2
This comment explores the merits of the FAA's decision to
exempt cargo carriers from the Flight Duty and Rest Require-
ments under Part 117 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, i.e.,
the "cargo carve-out." Part II sets out the factual and legislative
history of the Final Rule, including the congressional mandate
issued to the FAA in promulgating these new regulations. Part
III outlines the arguments made in favor of the "cargo carve-
out" and shows how the Final Rule differs from the Proposed
Rule in that area. Part IV analyzes the congressional mandate
given to the FAA and whether the FAA's use of a cost-benefit
analysis in allowing the cargo carve-out was legally and factually
warranted. Part V highlights the Fatigue Risk Management Sys-
tem as a built-in solution for this regulatory challenge.
II. THE AIRLINE SAFETY ACT OF 2010 AND THE
PROPOSED RULE
A. FACTUAL HISTORY
Globally, pilot fatigue has contributed to hundreds of deaths
and billions of lost dollars in aviation accidents occurring in the
last twenty years.4 3 The NTSB first cited fatigue as a probable
cause of an aviation accident in 1993 at the Naval Air Station in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.4 4 According to the NTSB, the captain
and the flight crew suffered from "acute sleep loss, sleep debt,
[and] circadian disruption," which caused the aircraft to crash
short of the runway. More recently, in July 2009, a French pilot
with only one hour of sleep was unable to regain control of his
aircraft when it hit bad weather over the Atlantic Ocean, which
resulted in the deaths of 228 people. 6 Then in 2010, a sleepy
capa-refutes-the-new-flightduty-time-regulations.1; see also Proposed Rule, supra
note 13, at 55,857 (acknowledging that "[f]atigue factors ... are universal").
42 Final Rule, supra note 36, at 30-31.
43 See Rosekind, supra note 8; see also Accidents Involving Fatigue, DEAD-TIRED.EU,
http://www.dead-tired.eu/pilot-fatigue/facts/accidents-involving-fatigue (last vis-
ited July 23, 2014).
44 Rosekind, supra note 8.
45 Id.
46 Peter Allen, Pilot of Air France jet That Crashed in Atlantic Ocean Killing 228
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pilot was blamed for the death of 158 people when his plane
overshot his targeted runway in Mumbai, India.4 7
In the United States, prior to 2009, fatigue was thought to
have contributed to over 300 aviation fatalities.4 8 Yet previous
proposals by the FAA to independently address pilot fatigue had
failed.49 Then in 2009, Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed in Buf-
falo, New York, killing all forty-nine people on board and one
person on the ground.o Once the accident was investigated, it
was discovered that both pilots were severely sleep deprived and
had made transnational flights prior to beginning their sched-
uled flight.51 At the time, fatigue had been on the NTSB's "Most
Wanted List" since 1990;52 however, the Colgan crash brought
pilot fatigue to the forefront of the American dialogue and fi-
nally motivated Congress to revisit the outdated regulations for
pilot duty and rest.53
B. THE CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE
The FAA had previously been unsuccessful in regulating pilot
fatigue, largely because such regulations lacked congressional
backing.54 On the heels of the Colgan tragedy, however, Con-
gress enacted the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration Extension Act of 2010 (the Airline Safety Act). 5 As part
of a larger aviation safety scheme, Section 212 of the Airline
Safety Act specifically directed the FAA to "address problems re-
lating to pilot fatigue."5
Congress gave the FAA six months from the date of the Air-
line Safety Act to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Pro-
posed Rule), and, after a comment period, the Final Rule was to
follow six months later. Most importantly, Congress ordered
the FAA to use "the best available scientific information" to draft
47 AirIndia Plane Crash: 'Sleepy'Pilot Blamed, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11772562.
48 Rosekind, supra note 8.
49 DuBose, supra note 17, at 259-60.
50 Id. at 260; Rosekind, supra note 8.
51 DuBose, supra note 17, at 258-59.
52 Rosekind, supra note 8.
53 DuBose, supra note 17, at 260.
54 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Indep. Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, No. 11-1483 (D.C. Cir.
filed Dec. 22, 2011), [hereinafter IPA Brief].
55 Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010,





rules limiting pilots' flight time and duty time with the ultimate
goal of reducing or eliminating fatigue-related fatalities and
other losses." This congressional mandate has become a source
of contention among the various parties affected by these new
regulations and will be examined further in Part IV.
C. THE PROPOSED RULE
In accordance with the congressional mandate, the FAA re-
leased its proposed rules in September 2010.5' The Proposed
Rule began with a sweeping declaration that the "current regula-
tions do not adequately address the risk of fatigue. "60 The FAA
then proposed changes to key areas of regulation: flight duty
period (FDP), cumulative flight time, total flight time, and rest
requirements. 6' In addition, the Proposed Rule eliminated all
distinctions between passenger and cargo carriers,6 2 holding
each to the same standards for pilot duty and rest.6 3 Even more
remarkably, the Proposed Rule also permitted a carrier to de-
velop its own plan-a Fatigue Risk Management System-to
combat fatigue if the carrier was unable or unwilling to operate
within the new rules.6 4 See Table A at the end of this section for
a summary of the Proposed Rule.
1. Right Duty and Rest Requirements
The hallmark of the Proposed Rule was the method of com-
putation for an FDP.65 The Proposed Rule included a matrix
that would alter the appropriate FDP on a case-by-case basis de-
pending on variables that are now known to increase pilot fa-
tigue: flying during the window of circadian low, flying routes
with several segments requiring multiple takeoffs and landings,
and flying at night." Thus, where the previous regulations had
allowed for FDPs of up to sixteen hours, the new schedule per-
mitted FDPs of only nine to thirteen hours depending on these
variables." The Proposed Rule also placed limits on the total
58 Id.
59 Proposed Rule, supra note 13.
60 Id. at 55,855.
61 DuBose, supra note 17, at 261-62.
62 14 C.F.R. § 117.1 (2014).
63 Proposed Rule, supra note 13, at 55,853.
64 Id. at 55,874.
65 DuBose, supra note 17, at 261-62.
66 Id.
67 Proposed Rule, supra note 13, at 55,858-59.
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amount of time a pilot may spend at the controls during an
FDP, 68 as well as the cumulative amount of duty time a pilot may
work in a seven-day and twenty-eight-day period. 9
In addition, the Proposed Rule made fundamental changes to
the rest requirements for pilots.70 Previous regulations had re-
quired an eight-hour rest period for pilots between shifts, with
the rest "clock" beginning immediately when the pilot's duty
ends.7 ' The new regulations, however, acknowledged that eight
hours of "rest" are not equal to eight hours of sleep opportunity
when other factors like commuting, hotel check-in, showers,
and meals are considered.7 2 The Proposed Rule therefore re-
quired that pilots be given a minimum of nine consecutive
hours of rest before the next shift, with the rest "clock" starting
when the pilot "reaches the hotel or other suitable
accommodation."7 3
2. The Inclusion of Cargo Carriers
In a dramatic departure from the previous regulations, the
Proposed Rule proudly declared that, after considering the rele-
vant science, international standards, and industry recommen-
dations, "distinctions between domestic, flag, and supplemental
operations are eliminated."7 Consistent with its mandate to use
the best available science in the interest of safety, the FAA cited
the "universal' nature of fatigue in announcing its scientific
sleep findings:
Most people need eight hours of sleep to function effectively;
most people find it more difficult to sleep during the day than
during the night, resulting in greater fatigue if working at night;
the longer one has been awake and the longer one spends on
task, the greater the likelihood of fatigue; and fatigue leads to an
increased risk of making a mistake.
Notably, the Proposed Rule acknowledged that "there are no
physiological differences between pilots who fly cargo planes and
pilots who fly passenger planes."7 6 Though the FAA was "sympa-
68 DuBose, supra note 17, at 263-64.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 266.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Proposed Rule, supra note 13, at 55,888.
74 Id. at 55,854.
75 Id. at 55,857 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 55,863 (emphasis added).
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thetic" to the fact that the new regulations may "disproportion-
ately impact [cargo carriers'] business models," it clearly placed
a higher priority on safety in its initial proposal."
3. Fatigue Risk Management Systems
With the understanding that some carriers' operations might
not conform well to the new regulatory scheme, the FAA pro-
posed an innovative way to allow specific carriers to essentially
self-regulate: the Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS).8
The FRMS alternative is a "cooperative approach" between the
carrier and the FAA that enables the carrier to develop its own
methods of mitigating fatigue, which would then require ap-
proval and monitoring by the FAA.
A good FRMS should use scientific data on fatigue to custom-
ize its flight duty and rest policies in order to provide an
"equivalent level of safety" to the Proposed Rule.80 Toward that
end, the FAA provided further guidance for carriers wishing to
establish an FRMS by publishing Advisory Circular 120-103,
which outlines the FAA's requirements for approval." For exam-
ple, an FRMS should include systems like: (1) education and
fatigue awareness training for pilots; (2) a non-punitive report-
ing system for pilots who are too fatigued for duty; (3) a peri-
odic evaluation of the FRMS; and (4) a non-punitive system for
reporting fatigue-induced errors and incidents.82 Moreover, the
FRMS provides flexibility because a carrier may use it only as
needed for certain routes or segments of their business, or, al-
ternatively, a carrier may opt to apply the FRMS to the entire
organization. 3 Thus, by making the FRMS a viable and attaina-
ble alternative, the FAA effectively provided the opportunity for
carriers to exempt themselves from the new regulations for part
or all of their operations.8 4
77 Id. at 55,857.
78 Id. at 55,874.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.; FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 102-103: FATIGUE RISK
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR AVIATION SAFETY (2010) [hereinafter ADVISORY
CIRCULAR].
82 ADVISORY CIRCULAR, supra note 81, at 6-9.
83 Proposed Rule, supra note 13, at 55,874.
84 See id.
2014] 411
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Table A: Summary of Final Rule vs. Current Rule,
by Provision8 5
Items NPRM Current/Previous Rule
Distinction Limits are differentBetween Kind of Single rule for all kinds of operations. based upon the kind ofPassenger No distinctions. operations.
Operations
Joint responsibility between the pilot
and airline for ensuring the pilot is fit Current rule language
Fitness For Duty for duty. The pilot must sign that he or requiring the pilot to
she is "fit" to take the flight. If a pilot report fit for duty is not
reports fatigue, the airline must remove as clear.
that pilot from duty.
Fatigue Risk Option to develop an FAA-approved
Management alternative method of compliance.
System
Provide annual fatigue education and
Fatigue awareness education for pilots,
Education and dispatchers, individuals directly Not required by current
Awareness involved in the scheduling of pilots, regulations, but isAwarness individuals directly involved in required as part of
Trorang operational control, and any employee public law.
Program providing direct management oversight
of those areas.
Flight Duty Applied to night operations requiring at
Period: Split least 3 hours of rest during the flight No limit.
Duty duty period (FDP).
Limits the length of the FDP based Limits do not factor inFlight Duty Liin the le the FDP asd circadian issues or the
Period (FDP) upon the time the FDP starts and the nme fsgetPeriods (F P) number of segments
number of segments flown. flown.
The pilot must be given a rest period of
at least 10 consecutive hours No limit other than 24
Reserve Status immediately before beginning a reserve hours free from duty in
period, measured from the time the
flighterew member is released from
duty.
Limits the FDP hours during any week
Cumulative and 4-week period. Limits flight time Limits flight hours on a
Limitations for any 4-week period and any 365-day daily and yearly basis.
period.
9 hours reducible to 8
Requires 10-hour rest period of which 8 hours rest. Do n
Rest Period hours is an uninterrupted sleep factor in sleep
opportunty. opportunity.
Reduced Rest Eliminated. Reducible to 8 hours of
rest.
85 Press Release, FAA, Fact Sheet-Pilot Fatigue Rule Comparison (Dec. 21,
2011), available at http://www.faa.gov/news/fact-sheets/news-story.cfm?news
Id=13273.
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In sum, the proposed regulations represent the FAA's most
effective attempt to meaningfully update the flight duty and rest
requirements for commercial airline pilots since the 1980s. By
attempting to incorporate the latest scientific data on fatigue,
while demonstrating a true consideration of business interests,
the Proposed Rule was a comprehensive first step toward in-
creasing aviation safety in furtherance of the Airline Safety Act's
mandate.
D. THE INITIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
The Proposed Rule outlined the costs and benefits of the pro-
posed regulations using a combination of historical evidence
and statistical derivations."6 In its required regulatory disclo-
sures, the FAA conceded that a "substantial number" of small
businesses would be affected," and that the new rule was tanta-
mount to an "unfunded mandate" based upon the total costs
that would necessarily be borne by state or local governments
and the private sector." Nevertheless, the FAA concluded that
the new rule "[h]as benefits that justify its costs.""
In its initial cost-benefit analysis (CBA), the FAA identified
four primary cost elements that would be borne by the aviation
industry in implementing the new regulations."o These include
flight operations, fatigue training, rest facilities, and schedule
reliability-all to the tune of $803.5 million.9 1
86 Proposed Rule, supra note 13, at 55,876.
87 Id. (disclosing under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-354,
94 Stat. 1164, which "requir[es] agencies to analyze the economic impact of regu-
latory changes on small entities.").
88 Id. (disclosing under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
104-4, 109 Stat. 48, which "requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
[f]ederal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by [sitate, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate or by the private sector, of $100 million or more
annually.").
89 Id.
go Id. at 55,877.
91 Id. (present value calculated using a 7% discount rate, $1.25 billion over ten
years).
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Table B: Summary of Costs (in millions)12
Cost Component Nominal Cost (over Present Value10 years)
Flight Operations $760.3 $484.2
Schedule Reliability $4.9 $3.0
Fatigue Training $262.3 $167.2
Rest Facilities $226.6 $149.1
Total $1,254.1 $803.5
The FAA also determined that it would cost $144.9 million9 3 for
these companies to develop fatigue risk management systems,
but it went on to conclude that these costs "would be more than
offset by a reduction in crew scheduling costs." 9 4
In the benefit analysis, the FAA began by citing pilot fatigue as
a causal factor in eighteen aviation accidents occurring from
1990 to 2010."5 From there, statistical determinations were made
regarding the number of accidents occurring from the various
types of fatigue as a factor. 6 Using this data, the FAA projected
that pilot fatigue would contribute to 18.8 accidents over the
next twenty years: 13 passenger accidents and 5.8 cargo acci-
dents." In addition, it was estimated that a total of 28.9 acci-
dents would occur over the next ten years, with an average of
174.7 fatalities." Then, after calculating that the proposed regu-
lations would prevent 40% of passenger accidents and 58% of
cargo accidents, the FAA estimated that the total benefits of the
new regulations would be approximately $463.8 million." When
this number is combined with the estimated benefit of avoided
92 Id.
Id. ($205.7 million over ten years).
9 Id.
95 Id. at 55,876.
96 Id.
[The FAA] statistically identified 4.6 accidents where the flight crew
became fatigued during a long flight-duty period[,] . . . three acci-
dents where the pilot became fatigued due to being awake for
many hours[,] . . . [and] two accidents where chronic fatigue was a
contributing factor... . [The FAA] also statistically estimated that
some of the 6.2 accidents that occurred between midnight and 6




- Id. at 55,877 (all values given are present value).
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ground damage, $340 million, the benefits and costs become
equal: $804 million.100 On top of this, the FAA noted that the
benefits from preventing even a single catastrophic passenger-
aircraft accident-one with 150 passengers and an average
load-would itself exceed $804 million.'01 These conclusions
tipped the scale in favor of moving forward with the Proposed
Rule.1 02
III. BACKLASH FROM THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY
Shortly after the FAA released the Proposed Rule, air cargo
carriers launched a fiery campaign to voice their disapproval for
the proposed regulations. 0 3 During the brief window for com-
ment, the Air Transportation Association (ATA), Cargo Airline
Association (CAA), Federal Express, UPS, National Air Carriers
Association, Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Lynden Air Cargo,
Omni Air International, Inc., and Southern Air, Inc. filed com-
ments on the Proposed Rule.104 Leading the pack, UPS lobbed a
host of criticisms at the Proposed Rule, specifically decrying its
"'one size fits all' approach to fatigue management." 0 This sec-
tion examines both the cargo carriers' primary complaints
about the Proposed Rule and the Final Rule that followed.
A. PRIMARY COMPLAINTS
In its comments to the FAA, UPS attacked the Proposed Rule
from virtually every angle: procedural, scientific, statutory, and
even constitutional. 0 6 Not surprisingly, however, UPS's economic
arguments appear to be of greatest concern to the cargo carrier.
1. Apples vs. Oranges
To begin with, UPS claimed that the Proposed Rule lacked a
"rational basis" for equating cargo and passenger operations.'
"[O]verturning a decades-old regime" that differentiates be-
100 Id.
101 Id. at 55,878 (when an averted fatality is valued at $12.6 million per
person).
102 Id.
103 See UPS COMMENTS, supra note 24.
104 OFFICE OF AVIATION POLICY & PLANS, FAA, INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL REGULA-
TORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FLIGHTCREW MEMBER DUTY AND REST REQUIREMENTS, PART
117, FINAL RULE 3 (2012) [hereinafter INrrIAL SUPPLEMENTAL RIA].
105 UPS COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 15.
1o6 See id. at ii-iii.
107 Id. at 15.
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tween passenger and cargo carriers in many respects, UPS as-
serted, is "overly simplistic" and ignores the many differences
between the business models.108 At the core of the argument lies
the obvious: under Part-121 certificates, passenger planes may
hold hundreds of people while cargo planes hold only a few.o10
For example, an Airbus A300 may have as many as 324 people
on board when pilots, flight attendants, and passengers are to-
taled.110 On the other hand, a cargo Airbus A300 might only
have two pilots."1 Therefore, with an averted fatality valued at
$12.6 million per person,11 2 the value of an averted passenger-
plane accident is $4.08 billion, but the value of an averted cargo
accident is a mere $25.2 million." 3 UPS argued that this fact
alone should demonstrate the "apples and oranges" nature of
the two types of operations." 4
2. Statistical Methods
Weighing enormously in UPS's favor, the excellent safety re-
cord of the airline industry featured prominently in UPS's com-
ments to the FAA."' UPS asserted that the Proposed Rule's
statistical analysis, or lack thereof, concerning past aviation acci-
dents was "hopelessly flawed.""r6 In drafting the Proposed Rule,
the FAA relied upon just twenty-two aviation accident reports to
justify its new regulations."' In fact, the FAA analyzed 250 acci-
dents that were attributed to pilot error (as opposed to other
causes like mechanical failure), but its analysis was limited due
to the lack of scheduling information for many of the flights."'
Of the forty-three accidents for which the pilot's flight schedule
history was available, twenty-two were thought to have been
caused by pilot fatigue."' Dr. Donald B. Rubin of Harvard Uni-
versity's Statistics Department, a veteran statistical consultant to
various regulatory agencies, stressed the extremely small sample
size that these twenty-two accidents compose for the correspond-
108 Id. at 17.
109 Id. at 19.
110 Id.
-1 Id.
112 See Proposed Rule, supra note 13, at 55,877.
us UPS COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 19.
114 Id.
" See id. at 30.
116 Id. at 29.
117 Id. at 30.
's Id. at 30 n.33.
119 Id.
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ing time frame: 0.0000066%.120 Citing the dearth of data from
all the flights that "went right" or "almost went wrong," Dr.
Rubin blasted the small sampling into statistical irrelevance, call-
ing it "random speculation."' 2 '
In essence, UPS insisted that the FAA should have evaluated
flight data from more sources, such as incident reports where
pilots voluntarily report fatigue on an otherwise safe and suc-
cessful flight, line checks, and flight data recorder monitor-
ing.12 2 In this way, the FAA could have made better assessments
as to the true causes of these accidents, as well as provide data
on why the vast majority of flights were successful even in the
presence of certain fatigue-inducing factors.123
According to UPS, the best statistical methods would examine
successful flights, not just the unsuccessful flights, to determine
the real triggers-most likely human factors.12 4 UPS contends
that it is not the length of the rest periods that most contribute
to fatigue, but pilots' poor use of those rest periods.'12 To sup-
port this contention, UPS cited examples of flights that would
be "legal" under the new regulations, but which nevertheless
crashed due to pilots' misuse of their days off.12 6 On Continental
Express Flight 2733, one of the accidents analyzed by the FAA in
developing the Proposed Rule, the flight crew had come off of a
nineteen-hour rest period prior to their scheduled duty.'12 On
another doomed flight, Federal Express Flight 1478, the pilot
had an ample rest period yet had used his time off to care for a
sick pet.12
In fact, Flight 1478 was the only all-cargo accident in the
FAA's sampling of aviation accidents.' 2 9 So, turning the FAA's
derivation methods against it, UPS argued that since zero fa-
tigue-related cargo accidents happened during the last ten
years, zero fatigue-related cargo accidents will happen in the
next ten years. 3 0 Furthermore, the comments claim that even if
one accident were to be prevented by the new regulations, in
120 Id. at 30.
121 Id. at 30-31.
122 Id. at 31.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 55.
125 Id.




130 Id. at 49.
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the best case scenario, that benefit would be less than $30 mil-
lion when the loss of two pilots and the cargo were
considered.1 3 1
3. The Cargo Cost-Benefit Analysis
In contrast to the meager benefits to UPS of $31 million for a
maximum of one averted cargo crash, UPS estimated astronomi-
cal costs to itself.13 2 In direct operational costs alone, UPS pro-
jected spending between $960 million and $1.29 billion to
comply with the new rule.13 3
Table C: UPS's Estimated Cost of Compliance1 3 1
Regulation 10-Year Costs (Low) 10-Year Costs (High)
Schedule Reliability (§ 117.9) $435,425,310 $535,687,717
Fatigue Training (§ 117.11) $17,107,560 $17,107,560
Flight Duty Period Limitations and $40,104,9628 $552,875,559
FDP Extensions (§§ 117.15 and
117.19)
Reserve Status (§ 117.21) $151,825,931 $295,057,941
Cumulative Duty (§ 117.23) $20,911,873 $25,781,762
Rest Periods (§ 117.25) $42,969,603 $80,209,926
Consecutive Nighttime Operations $63,022,084 $74,480,645
(§ 117.27)
Implementing Crewmember $22,466,250 $33,468,000
Carrying Cost
Information Technology $5,000,000 $8,000,000
Infrastructure
Lost Revenue from and Installation $184,750,000 $184,750,000
Cost of Onboard Rest Facility
(§ 117.3)
Total $1,344,528,240 $1,807,419,110
Net Present Value $960,840,962 $1,290,123,595
In addition, UPS projected other indirect costs like lost good-
will among consumers, diminished value of its fleet of B767
freighter aircraft, and impaired ability to operate interna-
tionally.15
131 Id. at 19.
132 Id. at 38-45.
133 Id. at 40.
134 Id. at 41.
13 Id. at 42-45.
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In sum, the UPS comments paint a dire picture of the new
regulations and their effect on the air cargo industry: (1) fa-
tigue-related cargo accidents are rare to nonexistent; (2) when
they happen they are only a small fraction of the cost of a pas-
senger-plane crash; (3) the fatigue-related cargo crashes which
have occurred within the last ten years would not have been pre-
vented by the new regulations; and (4) the costs of implementa-
tion would be downright crippling to the industry.1 3 6 For these
reasons, UPS asserted that the Proposed Rule was "arbitrary and
capricious" and charged the FAA with adopting certain changes
or altogether exempting cargo carriers from the new rule.s 7
B. THE FINAL RULE
With little fanfare and seemingly complete capitulation to the
complaints from the air cargo industry, the FAA issued its Final
Rule for Flight Duty and Rest Requirements on December 21,
201 1.38 Although the new regulations were largely unchanged
with regard to passenger carriers, the Final Rule issued a whole-
sale exemption to all-cargo carriers, making compliance with
the Part 117 "voluntary."1 3 9
In its initial press release, the FAA made only the single
sweeping statement that "l[c] overing cargo operators under the
new rule would be too costly compared to the benefits gener-
ated in this portion of the industry.""o The Final Rule itself gave
few details about the reasons for this exclusion other than some
unsupported data in a single footnote, which read: "The pro-
jected cost for all-cargo operations is $306 million . . . . The
projected benefit of avoiding one fatal all-cargo accident ranges
between $20.35 million and $32.55 million, depending on the
number of crewmembers on board the aircraft."1 4 1 Apparently
relying solely on this calculation, the FAA determined that the
cost of compliance "significantly exceeded the quantified socie-
tal benefits."14 2
136 Id. at 4.
137 Id. at 56. The standard for overturning an administrative agency's regula-
tion is the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
138 FAA Press Release, supra note 39.
139 Final Rule, supra note 36, at 5, 31.
140 FAA Press Release, supra note 39.
141 Final Rule, supra note 36, at 13, n.1.
142 Id. at 13.
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C. THE PILOTS RESPOND
The Final Rule went into effect on January 4, 2014.143 Despite
the initial safety mandate given to the FAA and the "universal"
impact of fatigue on pilots, the overall costs of the regulations
apparently carried the most weight at the end of the day. 144
Without issuing any intermediary or updated versions of the
proposed regulations, the FAA issued the Final Rule with the
blanket cargo exemption, which took many cargo pilots' organi-
zations by surprise and prevented any opportunity for them to
comment on the exemption.145
In response, the Independent Pilots Association (IPA), the
collective bargaining organization for UPS pilots, filed a petition
for review with the D.C. Circuit on December 22, 2011.146 Not
wanting to delay implementation of the safety measures for pas-
senger operations by seeking to vacate the Final Rule, the IPA
asked the circuit court only to remand the Final Rule for recon-
sideration of the cargo carve-out.147 The FAA responded by ask-
ing the court to hold the suit in abeyance while it ostensibly
addressed the concerns of the IPA by reviewing the cost-benefit
analysis for cargo-only operations and allowing additional time
for comments.148
IV. THE CARGO CARVE-OUT IS LEGALLY AND
FACTUALLY UNJUSTIFIED
A. CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE VS. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The IPA's primary criticism of the Final Rule is that the FAA
failed to comply with the clear mandate to prioritize aviation
safety above all else when drafting the new regulations under
the Airline Safety Act.1 49 Specifically, the IPA argues that it was
impermissible for the FAA to solely consider the cost of ex-
tending the fatigue regulations to cargo carriers to the exclusion of
the acknowledged safety threat that fatigue poses to pilots and
the public."5 o Supporters of the cargo carve-out argue that a
14s Id. at 1.
144 INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL RIA, supra note 104, at 16.
145 See IPA Brief, supra note 54, at 42.
146 Petition for Review at 2, Indep. Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, No. 11-1483 (D.C. Cir.
filed Dec. 22, 2011).
147 IPA Brief, supra note 54, at 56.
148 INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL RIA, supra note 104, at 1.
14 IPA Brief, supra note 54, at 15.
150 Id. at 27.
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cost-benefit analysis was not only permitted but also required
when drafting new regulations.'' This section briefly sets out
the legal framework for the congressional mandate and the cost-
benefit analysis and argues that the Final Rule fails to comport
with the Airline Safety Act's mandate.
1. The Congressional Mandate as a Regulatory Guide
The Supreme Court has long held that "[i] t is axiomatic that
an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regu-
lations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress."'"'
When drafting a broad piece of legislation that necessarily in-
cludes a regulatory component for effective execution, Congress
will issue a congressional mandate-or an authoritative com-
mand-within the statute to guide the rulemaking agencies as
they craft the corresponding regulations.15 3
Congress prescribed certain standards for rulemaking under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946.154 As part of a
congressional effort to "improve the administration ofjustice by
prescribing fair administrative procedure," the APA established
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review for federal reg-
ulations."' Accordingly, courts are typically deferential to agen-
cies' decisions, but if an agency has "relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider" or drafted regulations
"that run[ ] counter to the evidence before the agency," such
regulations must be set aside as "arbitrary and capricious."156
Moreover, "[a] n agency acts arbitrarily if it ignores an issue that
Congress directs it to address"' or inexplicably abandons a sci-
entifically supported premise previously relied upon.15 8 In this
way, the congressional mandate represents an important check
151 See, e.g., COMMENTS OF ATLAS AIR WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., IN THE MAT-
TER OF FLIGHTCREW MEMBER DuTY AND REST REQUIREMENTS, INITIAL SUPPLEMEN-
TAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIs 5-7 (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://www.
noticeandcomment.com/FAA-2009-1093-2530-fcod-98590.aspx (click on image
displaying "PDF") [hereinafter ATLAS COMMENTS].
152 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
155 See id. at 208-09.
154 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
155 Id.; 5 U.S.C § 706(2) (A) (2012).
156 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
157 Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n, Inc., v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Ad-
min., 494 F.3d 188, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
158 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43.
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on the powers of the executive branch's rulemaking
authority.'
When ruling on substantive regulations according to a con-
gressional mandate, courts consider the authorizing statute and
the factors that an agency must consider when drafting regula-
tions. 16 0 More importantly, however, the Supreme Court has
made clear that it will not uphold regulations in which "ancil-
lary" or inferential portions of the statute override express provi-
sions that are fundamental to the very purpose of the
mandate.1 6 1 In other words, the Court assumes that Congress
does not intend to "hide elephants in mouseholes." 62 Such im-
balances, the Court has reasoned, would clearly have been ad-
dressed by Congress in the original statute and should therefore
not play a role in the resulting regulatory scheme.1 6 3
With the goal of "address [ing] problems relat[ed] to pilot fa-
tigue," the Airline Safety Act required the FAA to draft new reg-
ulations "based on the best available scientific information"
using thirteen enumerated factors.16 4 The first twelve factors are
clearly concerned with correlating the duties of a pilot with the
current science of fatigue:
(1) Time of day of flights in a duty period.
(2) Number of takeoff and landings in a duty period.
(3) Number of time zones crossed in a duty period.
(4) The impact of functioning in multiple time zones or on
different daily schedules.
(5) Research conducted on fatigue, sleep, and circadian
rhythms.
(6) Sleep and rest requirements recommended by the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
(7) International standards regarding flight schedules and
duty periods.
(8) Alternative procedures to facilitate alertness in the
cockpit.
(9) Scheduling and attendance policies and practices, in-
cluding sick leave.
159 See id.
160 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
161 Id. at 468.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 469.
16 Airline Safety Act, supra note 55, § 212.
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(10) The effects of commuting, the means of commuting,
and the length of the commute.
(11) Medical screening and treatment.
(12) Rest environments.'
Then, as is common in legislation, the Airline Safety Act in-
cluded one additional "catch-all" factor that the FAA was permit-
ted-some say required-to use in drafting the regulations:
(13) Any other matters the Administrator considers
appropriate.' 6'
Both the opponents and the proponents of the Final Rule
point to this congressional mandate to support their positions as
to the inclusion or exclusion of cargo carriers under Part 117.167
Opponents like the IPA and other pilots associations1 6 s maintain
that the Airline Safety Act has a clear safety focus, as evidenced
by the fact that twelve of the thirteen factors address the science
of fatigue.1 6 1 On the other hand, supporters of the cargo carve-
out maintain that the thirteenth factor, by itself, broadly autho-
rizes the FAA to consider other factors, the most "appropriate"
of which being costs versus benefits.1 70
2. The Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Regulatory Tool
Since the Reagan administration, the CBA has been a funda-
mental part of the U.S. regulatory landscape and, indeed, is
often the primary decision-making tool.1 7 1 Under a CBA, the
projected benefit of a proposed regulation is simply balanced
against its projected costs to determine whether total societal
value would be increased by its implementation.1 7 2 Two addi-
tional executive orders further solidified the CBA as a ubiqui-
165 Id. § 212(2) (A)-(L) (numbering added).
166 Id. § 212(2) (M).
167 See COMMENTS OF INDEPENDENT PILOTS ASSOCIATION, IN THE MATTER OF
FLIGHTCREW MEMBER DUTY AND REST REQUIREMENTS, INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL REGU-
LATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 70-71 (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.ipapilot.
org/ipavfaa/IPACommentsonFAAlnitialSupplementalRIA.pdf [hereinafter IPA
COMMENTS]; ATLAS COMMENTS, supra note 151, at 7.
168 Such as the Cargo Airline Pilots Association (CAPA), the Air Line Pilots'
Association (ALPA), the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations
(IFALPA), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
169 IPA COMMENTS, supra note 167, at 70.
170 See ATLAS COMMENTS, supra note 151, at 5.
171 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1988); Helen G. Boutrous, Regulatory Review in the Obama Administration: Cost-
Benefit Analysis for Everyone, 62 ADMIN. L. REv. 243, 244 (2010).
172 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2(b)-(d).
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tous regulatory device: (1) Executive Order 12,866 under
President Clinton, which requires assessment of "all costs and
benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alter-
native of not regulating";1 7 and (2) Executive Order 13,563
under President Obama, which requires "a reasoned determina-
tion" that benefits justify costs when proposing or adopting a
regulation. 174
The CBA acquired an "accepted institutional role" within the
administrative branch, and this role has been judicially blessed
as well. 17 The D.C. Circuit, which holds original jurisdiction in
federal rulemaking review, has routinely held that agencies may
use a CBA when drafting regulations absent a "clear congres-
sional intent to preclude consideration of cost."1 7 ' Then, in
2009, the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the CBA as a valid
rulemaking factor in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.17 7 In Entergy,
the Court considered a congressional mandate to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) that required the EPA to use
"the best technology available for minimizing adverse environ-
mental impact" under the Clean Water Act.1 7" Though the
Clean Water Act itself is silent on whether the EPA was permit-
ted to consider costs in its rulemaking effort, the Supreme
Court conclusively stated: "It is eminently reasonable to con-
clude that [the statute's] silence is meant to convey nothing
more than a refusal to tie the agency's hands as to whether cost-
benefit analysis should be used, and if so to what degree.""1 7
On the other hand, the CBA has some important limiting
principles as well. Executive Order 12,866 expressly states that it
applies "unless a statute requires another regulatory approach,"
which clearly contemplates a regulatory situation in which a
CBA might not be used. 1 0 Likewise, Executive Order 13,563,
which is merely supplemental to 12,866, reaffirms that it may
173 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006).
174 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
175 Boutrous, supra note 171, at 248.
176 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see
also George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 622-24 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Natural
Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641, 643-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
177 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009).
178 Id. at 218.
179 Id. at 222.
180 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2006).
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not interfere or displace "authority granted by a law to a depart-
ment or agency."1 8 1 Furthermore, the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) prepared a primer to assist agencies
in preparing CBAs as required under these Executive Orders, in
which it acknowledged that "some important benefits and costs
... may be difficult or impossible to quantify."' 8 2 The primer
stressed the importance of considering these "non-quantifiable
and non-monetized benefits and costs" as a component of the
total CBA.'" The Administrator of OIRA and noted economist
Cass Sunstein clarified that the CBA must be "humanized," and
further:
[C] ost-benefit analysis should not put regulation in an arithmetic
straitjacket; that there are values and morals, distributional, aes-
thetic, and otherwise, that have to play a part in the overall judg-
ment about what is to be done.... [T]here are limits to purely
economic approaches to valuation of cost and benefits.184
Ultimately, "the President is without authority to set aside con-
gressional legislation by executive order," and therefore, the
CBA is but one of many tools for agencies to use when issuing
new regulations according to a statutory mandate.'18
3. The Final Rule Fails to Comport with the Congressional Mandate
With the legal framework established, it is clear that the FAA
fell short of its mandate under the Airline Safety Act by exclud-
ing cargo carriers from the flight duty and rest requirements.
a. Enterg Does Not Apply to the Airline Safety Act
As stated, the Airline Safety Act includes thirteen factors that
Congress authorized the FAA to consider when drafting the new
regulations, the thirteenth of which is: "[a]ny other matters the
Administrator considers appropriate."1 8 6 Therefore, relying on
181 Exec. Order No. 13,563, §§ 1, 7(b) (i), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
182 OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRs, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYsIs: A
PRIMER 12, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/in-
foreg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf.
183 Id.
184 Nomination of Cass R. Sunstein to Be Administrator, Office of Information & Regu-
latory Affairs, Office of Management & Budget: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Home-
land Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Cass R.
Sunstein).
185 In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
186 Airline Safety Act, supra note 55, § 212(2) (M).
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Entergy, proponents of the cargo carve-out maintain that that
this thirteenth factor is not merely tacit approval but express au-
thorization for the FAA to consider costs and benefits in its
rulemaking.'17
Although Entergy seems to provide strong support in favor of
the cargo carriers' position, the statute at issue in Entergy---a por-
tion of the Clean Water Act-was very different from the Airline
Safety Act.'8" Granted, both statutes order the agencies to use
the best technology and the best science, respectively, to achieve
their goals." 9 The Airline Safety Act, however, provided thirteen
factors that it authorized the FAA to consider in drafting the
regulations, but the Entergy statute provided none.1"o With this
legislative backdrop, the Supreme Court had little to work with
when issuing its opinion and understandably sought to refrain
from " [tying] the ... hands" of the EPA by precluding the use of
a CBA. 19
b. It Is Irrelevant That the Airline Safety Act Did Not
Expressly Preclude Consideration of Costs
Congress knows how to authorize a consideration of cost
when it wants to, which is something it has seldom directed the
FAA to do, likely because of the FAA's duty to make "safety and
security ... the highest priorities in air commerce. "192 For exam-
ple, Congress did expressly authorize the FAA to consider costs
when developing regulations for commuter-airport operating
certificates1 9 3 and when considering certain airport exemptions
from various emergency services certifications.19 4 Furthermore,
Congress also authorized a consideration of costs and benefits
when legislating duty periods for drivers in another part of the
transportation industry-commercial motor vehicles.1 5
Here, Congress specifically ordered that twelve fatigue-related
factors be considered in drafting the Proposed Rule. Admit-
tedly, there was no express preclusion of cost in the mandate,
but neither executive orders nor relevant case law permit the
187 See, e.g., ATLAS COMMENTS, supra note 151, at 6.
188 See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
189 See Airline Safety Act, supra note 55, § 212(2); 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
190 See id.
191 See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 222 (2009).
192 IPA COMMENTS, supra note 167, at 72 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)).
193 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44706(d)).
194 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44706 (c)).
19 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31136(c) (2)).
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FAA to ignore the mandated factors in favor of a cost-benefit
analysis. Such a conclusion would be tantamount to "hiding an
elephant in a mousehole"19 6 and goes far beyond what Congress
intended in passing this act.
c. The Cargo Exemption Directly Ignores the Congressional
Mandate
Based on the language of the Airline Safety Act, Congress
clearly intended the FAA to "address problems related to pilot
fatigue" using a scientific approach. 1 9 7 As the IPA highlights, this
approach is supported by the legislative history of the Act, which
seeks to update the flight duty and rest requirements to "more
adequately . . . reflect scientific research on fatigue." 198
The Proposed Rule set forth a number findings based on fa-
tigue research, which apply universally to passenger and cargo
pilots when operating under known fatigue-inducing circum-
stances, such as flying at night during the window of circadian
low. 9 The Proposed Rule even stated boldly that the "current
regulations do not adequately address the risk of fatigue,"oo and
further acknowledged that cargo pilots are particularly suscepti-
ble to fatigue given the disproportionate amount of nightime
flying in the all-cargo model.2 0 1 Despite these premises, the Fi-
nal Rule did nothing whatsoever to "address the risk of fatigue" in
cargo pilots. 2 0 2 In sum, by issuing the Final Rule with the cargo
carve-out, the FAA clearly failed to comply with the congres-
sional mandate under the Airline Safety Act.
B. A BETTER COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Irrespective of whether the FAA acted according to its con-
gressional mandate, cargo carriers should be included under
Part 117. Even if cost is a factor-even the prime factor-the
cargo inclusion can fit neatly within a standard cost-benefit anal-
ysis when benefits are realistically considered and costs are sub-
ject to basic economic principles.
196 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484 (2001).
197 Airline Safety Act, supra note 55, § 212(1).
198 H.R. REP. No. 111-284, at 6 (2009).
199 Proposed Rule, supra note 13, at 55,857-58.
200 Id. at 55,855.
201 Id.
202 See Airline Safety Act, supra note 55, § 212(1).
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1. Overstated Costs: Economics 101
After the Final Rule was released and the subsequent petition
for review was filed by the IPA, the FAA prepared a supplemen-
tal report to address concerns over the cost-benefit analysis used
in the Final Rule. 2 03 After supposedly conducting a review of its
initial findings, the FAA concluded that the total cost to the
cargo industry would be approximately $550 million over ten
years.2 0 4 Meanwhile, UPS maintained its assertion that its own
costs would be well north of $1 billion over ten years.205
In its supplemental brief, the IPA outlined several areas where
the FAA overstated the costs to the cargo industry, such as costs
for additional crew scheduling and costs for retrofitting aircraft
with rest facilities. 206 These assertions will not be addressed in
this article. Instead, the "cost" portion of the ledger will be
broadly addressed using only the "worst case scenario" numbers
set forth by the FAA and UPS.
One surprising cost consideration that was altogether omitted
from anyone's analysis was the ability of cargo carriers to raise
prices. The reality is, however, that this is precisely what would
happen. The likely result: minimal economic impact to the com-
panies or the consumers. The reason for this: low elasticity of
demand.
"Elasticity of demand" is defined as the percent change in
quantity demanded for an item per every 1% change in the
price of the item.2 0 7 Goods and services are said to have "high"
elasticity of demand when the number is greater than 1.0.208
This means that consumers will demand substantially less of a
good or service when the price increases.2 09 Conversely, for
items with a "low" elasticity of demand-a number less than
1.0-consumer demand will be less affected by a change in
price.210
Fortunately for the air cargo industry as a whole, the elasticity
of demand is considered to be low-estimated to be between .42
203 INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL RIA, supTra note 104, at 1.
204 Id. at 18.
205 See UPS COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 40.
206 IPA COMMENTS, supra note 167, at 54, 59.
207 RICHARD G. LIPSEY & COLIN HARBURY, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 62
(2d ed. 1992).




and .84.211 This means that consumers will continue to ship
packages by air (as opposed to switching to the U.S. Postal Ser-
vice or some other slower method of transportation) even when
prices rise.2  The likely reason for this is that, as discussed
above, society places a high value on shipping things quickly.213
"Cross elasticity of demand," on the other hand, is the mea-
sure of a change in demand for one company's goods or services
when another company's goods or services change in price. 2 14
Though air cargo services are frequently referred to as "elastic,"
this type of elasticity relates to the competitive nature of the in-
dustry-its cross-elasticity with its competitors.2 1
- In other words,
when UPS increases its prices, more consumers will switch to
FedEx for their shipping needs and vice versa. However, if all air
cargo companies must raise prices due to a regulatory change,
consumers will have no ready alternatives for overnight ship-
ping. Therefore, the net industry impact will likely be limited.
In addition, a very small change in price would more than
offset the air carriers' projected compliance costs over ten years,
even using UPS's sky-high cost projections of $1.8 billion.1 6
Combined, FedEx and UPS deliver over six billion packages
each year.2 1 7 UPS alone delivers 16.3 million packages every day,
about fourteen million of those in the United States.21 8 These
companies could raise prices on their U.S. deliveries alone2 19 by
mere pennies per delivery and completely offset the projected
costs-which is precisely what they will do as rational, self-inter-
ested businesses. In light of these economic considerations,
shifting costs to consumers is to be expected among the cargo
carriers, and therefore, this critical offset should be included
when considering costs and benefits under the Final Rule.
211 ROLF HELLERMANN, CAPACITY OPTIONS FOR REVENUE MANAGEMENT: THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS IN THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY 158 (2006).
212 See id.
213 IPA COMMENTS, supra note 167, at 40.
214 LIPSEY & HARBURY, supra note 207, at 68.
215 See, e.g., Alexis Devan, Macroeconomic Factors of the Package/Parcel Delivery In-
dustry, YAHOO! VOICES (May 6, 2010), http://voices.yahoo.com/macroeconomic-
factors-package-parcel-delivery-5933494.html?cat=3.
216 See UPS COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 41.
217 Brian A. Shactman, How UPS, Fed Ex Move 25 Million Packages a Day, CNBC
(Jan. 20, 2012, 11:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/46071532.
218 Worldwide Facts, UPS.com, http://www.ups.com/content/us/en/about/
facts/worldwide.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
219 This would allay concerns that the increasing prices would reduce competi-
tiveness among foreign air cargo companies. See, e.g., UPS COMMENTS, supra note
24, at 42.
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2. The Real Benefits of Part 117
Just as the costs of including cargo operations under the Final
Rule were overestimated, the potential benefits were grossly un-
derestimated. As discussed in Part III, the FAA assumes that ap-
plying Part 117 to cargo pilots would prevent only one cargo
accident over ten years.2 2 0 The "benefits" of the rule were then
extracted from this single accident and limited to: (1) the value
of the lost lives of two pilots; and (2) the value of the plane's
cargo for a total of approximately $31 million. 2 2 1 Not even UPS
believes that the likely damage would be this low, holding $1.5
billion of insurance for a single accident.222 In fact, there are sev-
eral broad categories of benefits from averting a single cargo
accident. Some of these benefits are directly related to the very
reasons UPS cites as cause for exemption, namely, the unique
role of cargo carriers in the fast-paced global economy. Other
benefits relate to "the random nature of accidents and their po-
tential for catastrophic consequences."223
a. Avoiding Loss in the Express Cargo Sector
As UPS effectively argued in its comments, when cargo flights
are delayed, there can be broad economic consequences stem-
ming from the untimely delivery of vital medical, industrial, and
business shipments. 22' The mere fact that a shipper chooses to
ship overnight shows that he places value on the quick delivery
of the item."' So, what if a cargo plane crashes? These deliveries
will not arrive, and real economic costs must be attributed to
such losses. In addition, the cargo company or its insurer will
have to refund both the cost of the shipment and the cost of the
item destroyed.
Furthermore, the cargo fleet will lose the services of the de-
stroyed aircraft. This will result in: (1) a disruption in the nor-
mal flow of operations for the cargo company while the existing
fleet of aircraft accommodates the same amount of cargo; and
(2) the addition of another aircraft into the fleet, which will re-
quire the purchase of a new aircraft or the refurbishing of an
existing aircraft in order to resume normal business operations.
220 INITIAL SUPPLEMENTAL RIA, supra note 104, at 3.
221 Id.
222 Sullenberger & Hall, supra note 22.
223 IPA COMMENTS, supra note 167, at 36.
224 UPS COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 5.
225 See IPA COMMENTS, supra note 167, at 40.
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Thus, the benefits flowing from an averted cargo crash should
include not only the value of the cargo itself but also the societal
value associated with express delivery, the benefits from the
avoided refunds and loss compensation to shippers, and the
avoidance of temporary business disruption from the loss of the
aircraft.
b. Benefits on the Ground
The FAA also calculated the costs of a cargo crash in a vac-
uum, completely failing to consider the innumerable benefits to
life and property on the ground. First, if the cargo plane is con-
siderate enough to crash in an open field, there will still be con-
siderable damage to the land which will need to be restored.
Not only that, but there will likely be environmental clean-up as
well, resulting from jet fuel and other hazardous substances,
which are often transported via cargo plane."2
Second, although the FAA limited the loss of human life to
two pilots total, cargo planes frequently carry passengers.
Most UPS cargo planes are equipped with four or five 'jump-
seats," which can be used by a variety of non-revenue passengers
like "deadheading crews, mechanics, loaders, animal handlers,
company officials and employees, military couriers, and FAA
and NTSB officials." 2 2 8
Third, and most critically, the FAA failed to consider fatalities
and injuries on the ground. As Americans are all-too aware, an
airplane that crashes into a populated area might as well be a
bomb. It is clearly erroneous for the FAA to limit the cata-
strophic consequences of a cargo plane crash to the pilots alone.
Historically, plane crashes yield an average of 5.5 ground fatali-
ties,2 29 but the number can be much larger. For example, the
1992 crash of the El Al cargo plane in Amsterdam killed forty-
three people on the ground and wounded twenty-six others
when it slammed into an apartment building on its final
descent.230
In addition, there are other benefits like avoiding minor air-
craft damage that occurs at airports during taxiing,23 1 avoiding
226 Id. at 23-24.
227 Id. at 33.
228 Id. at 33-34.
229 Id. at 38.
250 Id. at 34.
231 This was actually cited by the FAA in the Proposed Rule, but it was not
factored into the Final Rule. See id. at 45.
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runway closures at airports due to an accident,232 and the inci-
dental physical and mental health benefits to the pilots them-
selves from being well-rested.3 Though some of these benefits
may be difficult to quantify, they should not be disregarded in
the decision-making process, as specifically directed by the
MB234OMB.4
In sum, with part or all of the costs shifted away from the
cargo carriers and borne primarily by society-a few pennies per
shipment-the focus can turn to the real benefits of the new
rule. Even without specifically quantifying the total value, it is
clear that even avoiding a single cargo plane crash produces
benefits far in excess of the FAA's initial estimates.
C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
1. Rest: A Health and Safety Concern
When it comes to the health and safety of pilots, the FAA
maintains identical requirements for passenger and cargo pilots.
For example, all pilots must hold the correct medical certifi-
cates,"" pass identical health examinations,' and comport with
the mandatory retirement age.2 37 All of these provisions are
clearly aimed at protecting the pilots and the public irrespective
of whether the planes are carrying passengers or people.
The most appropriate comparison, however, is the FAA's
wholesale restriction on the use of drugs and alcohol, substances
that the FAA has regulated pilots' use of for over fifty years. 3
Fatigue studies have conclusively shown that fatigued individuals
perform at least as badly, or worse, than individuals with blood
alcohol contents of .05 239 -greater than the level of blood-alco-
hol ratio prohibited by the FAA in pilots (.04) .240 Given the in-
disputable dangers associated with operating a vehicle or
232 Id. at 41.
233 Id. at 48.
234 See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 182, at 12.
235 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(c), 61.23(a) (2014).
236 14 C.F.R. § 61.23(a).
237 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(e).
238 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.17; Air Traffic and General Operating Rules, 28 Fed. Reg.
6702, 6704-05 (June 29, 1963).
239 See, e.g., Drew Dawson et al., Quantitative Similarity Between the Cognitive Psy-
chomotor Perfomance Decrement Associated with Sustained Wakefulness and Alcohol In-
toxication, in QUEENSLAND MINING INDUSTRY HFALTH AND SAFETY CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 31, 39 (1998), available at http://www.qrc.org.au/conference/
_dbase upl/1998_spkOO5_Dawson.pdf.
240 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.17.
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airplane while intoxicated, it is easy to see why the FAA uni-
formly restricts the use of alcohol and drugs for pilots of all civil
aircraft. 24 1 As such, it is entirely illogical that the FAA would ex-
empt cargo pilots from rules regulating flight duty and rest re-
quirements, much less on the basis of cost. This reasoning flies
in the face of the FAA's congressional charge to "consider ...
the duty of an air carrier to provide service with the highest pos-
sible degree of safety in the public interest" when drafting regu-
lations.2 4 2 Instead, the FAA has opted to provide the "highest
possible degree" of shareholder return for the air cargo
companies.
2. Past Erroneous Exemptions
Furthermore, the FAA has erroneously exempted cargo carri-
ers from important safety measures in the past, only to then re-
verse itself and apply the regulations uniformly. 24 3 For example,
in the 1990s, cargo carriers were not required to be equipped
with collision avoidance systems (TCAS) .244 1996 brought the
tragic midair collision over India between a Saudi Arabian
jumbo jet and a small Kazak Airlines charter plane, which killed
349 people. 24 5 Then, in 1997, a UPS cargo plane had a near miss
with Air Force One-while President and Mrs. Clinton were on
board-just off the Irish coast.2 46 These incidents apparently
"woke the FAA up,"247 and soon thereafter, the FAA extended
the TCAS requirement to all cargo planes.2 48
3. The Safe Skies Act
Regardless of the musings over the potential judicial interpre-
tation of the Final Rule, or the cargo carriers' alarmist predica-
tions about the downfall of the air cargo industry, one thing is
certain: most people want pilots to be well-rested and fit for
duty. After the Final Rule was rolled out at the end of 2011, in
241 IPA COMMEws, supra note 167, at 76 (discussing 14 C.F.R. § 91.17).
242 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (d)(1) (A) (2006).
243 See Sullenberger & Hall, supra note 22.
244 See Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, 54 Fed. Reg. 940, 940-41
(Jan. 10, 1989).
245 Sullenberger & Hall, supra note 22.
246 Don Phillips, Air Force One Avoided Collision Off Irish Coast, WASH. POST, June
4, 1997, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1997-06-04/news/97060304
74_1 horizontal-separation-collision-avoidance-system-president-s-plane.
247 Sullenberger & Hall, supra note 22.
248 See Collision Avoidance Systems, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,506, 55,510 (Nov. 1, 2001)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 129).
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April 2012, Representatives Chip Cravaak (R-MN) and Tim
Bishop (D-NY) introduced the Safe Skies Act in the House.2 4 9
This Act would eliminate the cargo carve-out and require that
all pilots be held to the flight duty and rest requirements estab-
lished by the Final Rule .2 " A similar bipartisan bill was intro-
duced the following June in the Senate by Senators Barbara
Boxer (D-CA) and Olympia Snowe (R-ME).251
Though the 2012 bills did not make it out of committee
before the end of the year, they were quickly reintroduced in
2013 with the strong support of the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), the Cargo Airline Pilots Association (CAPA), and other
pilots' organizations, as well as aviation safety advocate Captain
Chesley Sullenberger, the noted pilot who safely landed in the
Hudson River in 2011 after a bird strike killed his engines.5
Time will tell if the political process will produce any meaning-
ful regulatory changes in 2014. However, the swift legislative re-
sponse to the Final Rule should at least put the FAA on notice
that many Americans are upset with the cargo carve-out and
want all airline pilots held to one standard of safety. As Captain
Sullenberger puts it: "When a large plane flies over your house
in the middle of the night, it doesn't matter whether it's carry-
ing cargo or passengers, whether you are a Democrat or a Re-
publican - the danger is all the same if the pilots are
fatigued." 253
V. FRMS: THE SIMPLE SOLUTION THAT NO ONE IS
TALKING ABOUT
After all the discussion about congressional mandates and
cost-benefit analyses, is this perhaps all much ado about noth-
ing? The debate is really about making an exception to the gen-
eral rule. The question should be: What kind of exception is
being made?
249 Safe Skies Act of 2012, H.R. 4350, 112th Cong. § 2.
250 Id.
251 Safe Skies Act of 2012, S. 3263, 112th Cong. § 2.
252 Safe Skies Act of 2013, S. 1692, 113th Cong.; Safe Skies Act of 2013, H.R.
182, 113th Cong.; Press Release, Air Line Pilots Ass'n, ALPA Supports Safe Skies
Act and Same Flight and Duty Rules for All Airline Pilots (Jan. 3, 2014), available
at http://www.alpa.org/Portals/Alpa/PressRoom/PressReleases/2014/1-3-14
14.01.htm; Chesley Sullenberger, Speaking Up for Safe Skies, SULLYSUL-
LENBERGER.COM (Nov. 13, 2013), http://sullysullenberger.com/#/blog.
253 Sullenberger, supra note 252.
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Under the Final Rule, a blanket exception is being made for
the entire air cargo industry. Part-121 carriers, however, can
range from large multi-national companies to small domestic
companies with only a single airplane. Just as the cargo industry
has understandably complained that a "one-size-fits-all" regula-
tory scheme is inappropriate, indeed a "one-size-fits-all" carve-
out is inappropriate as well.
Fortunately, the FAA already anticipated that different com-
panies would have different structures and business needs, and
it introduced a unique solution in the Proposed Rule: the Fa-
tigue Risk Management System. As discussed in Part II, the
FRMS provides an opportunity for companies to develop their
own strategies to deal with fatigue that best complement their
individual businesses.254 Is an FRMS more expensive than doing
nothing? Sure. However, by providing companies the ability to
design their own fatigue strategies, the FAA is in fact acknowl-
edging that "one-size-fits-all" regulations might unduly burden
some businesses. The FRMS, therefore, allows companies to
achieve better cost efficiency because they are not hemmed into
a rigid regulatory scheme and can work to achieve safety goals
and manage fatigue by developing their own "regulations," so to
speak.
Passenger carriers have already embraced the concept of the
FMRS, and many airlines have already implemented them suc-
cessfully.2 ' The International Air Transport Association (IATA),
which is the trade association for most of the world's major air-
lines, has published an informational guide to assist airlines in
developing their own FRMS.2 5 6 IATA touts the FRMS as a step in
the right direction "from prescriptive to performance based reg-
ulatory oversight" and presents it as an effective way to manage
fatigue while accounting for operational differences among
businesses.257
In its comments to the FAA regarding the Proposed Rule,
UPS went to great lengths to explain its own methods of manag-
ing fatigue, calling them "demonstrably better" than the meth-
ods put forth in the Proposed Rule. 5 It first discussed the UPS
254 See supra Part II.C.3 and accompanying notes.
255 INT'L AIR TRANS. Ass'N, FATIGUE RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: IMPLEMENTA-
TION GUIDE FOR OPERATORS 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.iata.org/publica-
tions/Pages/frms.aspx (click on "FRMS implementation guide - English").
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 UPS COMMENTS, supra note 24, at 7.
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business model and the extreme demands of the all-cargo indus-
try." It then explained its fatigue mitigation program, which
includes eight separate prevention methods: (1) duty period re-
strictions during the window of circadian low; (2) prohibitions
against "swapping" of daytime and nighttime flying schedules;
(3) time-zone crossing restrictions and increased rest for inter-
national flights; (4) circadian rhythm parameters in bid line
construction; (5) fatigue training for pilots; (6) voluntary non-
punitive self-reporting system; (7) non-punitive crewmember re-
porting system; and (8) state-of-the-art sleep facilities. 2 0 Good
for UPS! It sounds like they are on their way toward a first-rate
FRMS. Of course, the FAA would have to individually approve it,
but if the system adequately addresses pilot fatigue, as UPS
maintains, then it may be able to be approved with only minor
tweaks. This is precisely how an FMRS is supposed to work.
However, it would be illogical to simply conclude that, be-
cause one large cargo carrier is making great strides toward man-
aging fatigue, all cargo carriers should be exempt from the Final
Rule. Such a conclusion ignores the many potential differences
between operations of different sizes, including personnel, rest
facilities, and training systems. Yet this is exactly what the FAA
did in issuing the Final Rule with the cargo carve-out.
In sum, the FAA capitulated too easily to the cargo industry
giants without requiring them to thoughtfully consider the
FRMS as a meaningful alternative to the Final Rule. With a co-
operative effort between the FAA and cargo businesses, the
FRMS provides the best option for maintaining business effi-
ciency without sacrificing safety.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its well-intentioned Proposed Rule, the FAA suc-
cumbed to intense lobbying by the cargo industry and exempted
cargo-only operations from the Final Rule. In doing so, the FAA
failed to comply with the congressional mandate of the Airline
Safety Act by relying solely on cost considerations and ignoring
the statute's enumerated safety factors. However, even if a cost-
benefit analysis were appropriate, a cargo inclusion would be
easily justified when costs and benefits are realistically consid-
ered, especially when viewed in the context of FAA precedent
and the legislative response of the Safe Skies Act. Finally, Part
259 Id.
260 Id. at 8-11.
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117 need not result in burdensome regulatory restriction be-
cause of the unique option of the FRMS, which offers a simple
solution to meet business goals and safety goals in the most effi-
cient way possible.
Fatigue is a debt that must be paid, and it can only be paid
with sleep. All humans are susceptible to fatigue in certain situa-
tions like working on the "back side of the clock." Air carriers
and the government have a special duty to the public to ensure
that all pilots are well rested and fit for duty due to the
profound and catastrophic consequences that could result from
even a momentary lapse in judgment or response time. Accord-
ingly, Part 117 should apply to passenger and cargo pilots alike.
Just a few hours before he died, Cerea Beal, captain of the ill-
fated UPS cargo plane that would soon crash in Birmingham,
made a prescient-chilling-remark to his co-pilot, which was
captured on the cockpit voice recorder as they discussed the in-
explicable differences between passenger and cargo flight and
duty regulations:
I don't get that .... [Ilt should be one level of safety for everybody.26 1
261 Chesley Sullenberger, A Warning We Must Not Ignore, SULLYSUL-
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